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MANGERS AND TURBANS: NONVERBAL RELIGIOUS 
EXPRESSION IN A DIVERSE WORKPLACE 
Loren F. Selznick* 
I. INTRODUCTION
With the current emphasis on workplace diversity, researchers have
noted an increase in religious expression on the job and, 
consequently, in religious friction.1  Most of the literature focuses on 
speech, but other forms of expression, such as religious posters, 
symbols, and music, can cause dissension as well.2  Under Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, employers are required to 
accommodate the religious practices of employees in the workplace, 
unless doing so will cause undue hardship.3  Protected activity 
includes religious expression when employees sincerely believe their 
* Associate Professor of Business Law, Zeigler College of Business, Bloomsburg
University of Pennsylvania; 1983, Cornell Law School, J.D.  I would like to thank
Adam Zalewski, 2019 M.Acc., Bloomsburg University of Pennsylvania, for his
factual research.  All errors are my own.
1. Dallan F. Flake, Image Is Everything: Corporate Branding and Religious
Accommodation in the Workplace, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 699, 704–05 (2015); Sonia
Ghumman et al., Religious Discrimination in the Workplace: A Review and
Examination of Current and Future Trends, 28 J. BUS. & PSYCHOL. 439, 448–49
(2013).
 In addition to an increase of religious expression in the 
workplace, there has also been an increase in religious diversity in 
the American workforce.  This led one commentator to predict a 
few years ago that “[g]iven our increasingly pluralistic and 
diverse population, it is likely that religious conflict in the 
workplace may increase, unfortunate as this might be.  It is 
especially true as religions whose practices do not follow more 
familiar patterns are more widely represented in our work force.”   
Debbie N. Kaminer, When Religious Expression Creates a Hostile Work 
Environment: The Challenge of Balancing Competing Fundamental Rights, 4 N.Y.U. 
J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 81, 83 (2000) (alteration in original).  “In some instances, . . .
debates among employees have become adversarial and tendentious.”  Michael Wolf,
Religious Conflict in the Workplace: The Problem of the Proselytizing Employee, in
ARBITRATION 2009 DUE PROCESS IN THE WORKPLACE 129, 129 (Paul D. Staudohar ed.,
2010).
2. See DOUGLAS A. HICKS, RELIGION AND THE WORKPLACE: PLURALISM, SPIRITUALITY, 
LEADERSHIP 74–75 (2003).
3. Ghumman et al., supra note 1, at 444.
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religion requires it.4  This Article explores the accommodation of 
religious expression other than speech,5 when it may impose 
hardship,6 and how such hardship can be avoided.7 
Religious displays are most commonly associated with four kinds 
of hardship to employers: customer alienation,8 coworker 
distraction,9 religious harassment of coworkers,10 and mistaken 
attribution to employers or coworkers.11  Title VII law requires the 
employer and the religious employee to try to reach a compromise.12  
Each form of hardship needs a different approach.13 
II. DIVERSITY AND CONFLICT
American companies have sought diversity among their employees
since the 1980s.14  This has resulted in religiously diverse 
workplaces.15  Management experts agree that there are a number of 
benefits to workplace diversity,16 but it has also led to increased 
religious conflict at work.17  
A. More Religious Diversity
Until the late 1980s, attention to minority employees was limited to
complying with anti-discrimination laws and helping 
underrepresented groups assimilate.18  A 1987 research report, 
entitled Workforce 2000 Work and Workers for the 21st Century, led 
to a change in the diversity field.19  Workforce 2000 shifted the 
4. Id. at 444, 448.
5. See infra Section III.B.
6. See infra Part IV.
7. See infra Section V.D.
8. See infra Section IV.A.
9. See infra Section IV.B.
10. See infra Section IV.C.
11. See infra Section IV.D.
12. See infra Part V.
13. See infra Part V.
14. Rohini Anand & Mary-Frances Winters, A Retrospective View of Corporate Diversity
Training from 1964 to the Present, 7 ACAD. MGMT. LEARNING & EDUC. 356, 358–59
(2008).
15. Ghumman et al., supra note 1, at 448–49.
16. See Thomas Barta et al., Is There a Payoff from Top-Team Diversity?, MCKINSEY & 
CO. (Apr. 2012), https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/organization/our-
insights/is-there-a-payoff-from-top-team-diversity [https://perma.cc/47FQ-44SP].
17. See Ghumman et al., supra note 1, at 448–49.
18. Anand & Winters, supra note 14, at 357–59.
19. Id. at 358; see also WILLIAM B. JOHNSTON & ARNOLD E. PACKER, WORKFORCE 2000 
WORK AND WORKERS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY xiii–xxvii (1987).
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corporate focus to retention of diverse workers;20 because the United 
States was demographically changing,21 a successful business needed 
to learn how to retain a diverse workforce.22 Roosevelt Thomas, 
known as the “Father of Diversity,” wrote that recruitment was not 
the major problem, but fostering a workforce “where we is everyone” 
was critical to business survival.23 
Today, the increasingly diverse demography of the United States 
coupled with business globalization has led companies to place a 
higher value on inclusive and diversity-conscious leaders.24 
Understanding diversity has become a necessary business skill, like 
problem solving or punctuality.25  “[T]he 21st century variety of 
diversity training is focused on building skills and competencies that 
enable learners not only to value differences but also to be able to 
utilize them in making better business decisions.”26  Modern 
managers no longer assume that only certain groups need diversity 
training.27  Training for all employees has become necessary, as 
“employees need to be more cross-culturally competent in an 
increasingly global world.”28 
The American workplace is more religiously diverse than ever.29 
This increase in religious diversity at work can be attributed to a 
demographic shift in the United States population in general.30  As of 
2016, just 43% of Americans identified as both white and Christian, 
down from 81% in 1976.31  During the same period, and particularly 
since the 1990s, the religiously unaffiliated have “roughly tripled” to 
20. See Anand & Winters, supra note 14, at 358.
21. See id.
22. Id. at 361–62.
23. Id. at 359; Phaedra Brotherton, R. Roosevelt Thomas, Jr., ASS’N FOR TALENT DEV.
(May 2011), https://www.td.org/magazines/td-magazine/r-roosevelt-thomas-jr
[https://perma.cc/3ZY5-6U62].





29. See Kaminer, supra note 1, at 83.
30. See Daniel Cox & Robert P. Jones, America’s Changing Religious Identity, PUB. 
RELIGION RES. INST. (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.prri.org/research/american-religious-
landscape-christian-religiously-unaffiliated/ [https://perma.cc/5BER-BMEV].
31. Id.
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24%.32  The number of Buddhist, Hindu, and Muslim congregations 
in the United States has tripled since the 1970s.33 
Management experts say the trend in diversity has come with many 
benefits for organizations.34  According to one expert, “If you have 
more diversity and a pluralistic workforce, you have more 
opportunities to experience and learn different things. . . . As a result, 
the new experience process can have conflict, but you also get 
innovation and customer insight. If you can work through it, you get 
a net benefit.”35  Another touted benefit of workplace diversity is 
better company performance.36  In addition, increased diversity may 
make a company more attractive to potential employees.37  
B. Religious Conflict in the Workplace
Along with benefits, religious diversity in the workplace can lead
to conflict.38  Religious discrimination complaints have increased.39 
Moreover, American workers say they observe more religious 
32. Id.
33. Christopher P. Scheitle & Elaine Howard Ecklund, Examining the Effects of Exposure
to Religion in the Workplace on Perceptions of Religious Discrimination, 59 REV. 
RELIGIOUS RES. 1, 2 (2017).
34. Matthew Brown, Religious Discrimination in the Workplace Increases with Diversity,
DESERET NEWS (Sept. 2, 2013, 7:00 AM), https://www.deseretnews.com/article/86558
5613/Religious-discrimination-in-the-workplace-increases-with-diversity.html
[https://perma.cc/H6UF-VLR6].
35. Id.  A 2013 Deloitte study found that when employees think their organization is
committed to and supportive of diversity, and they feel included, their ability to
innovate increases by 83%.  DELOITTE & VICTORIAN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AND
HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, WAITER, IS THAT INCLUSION IN MY SOUP? A NEW RECIPE TO
IMPROVE BUSINESS PERFORMANCE 4 (2013),  https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/
Deloitte/au/Documents/human-capital/deloitte-au-hc-diversity-inclusion-soup-
0513.pdf [https://perma.cc/YPH2-EK2G].
36. A McKinsey & Company study found that companies with a diverse executive board
saw a 95% higher return on equity than those with less diverse executive boards.
Barta et al., supra note 16.
37. In a study by PricewaterhouseCoopers, 45% of males and 54% of females researched
diversity and inclusion policies of a company before accepting a job offer, and 48% of
males and 61% of females looked at the diversity of the leadership team.  Magnet for
Talent: Managing Diversity as a Reputational Risk and Business Opportunity, PWC 8 
(2017), https://www.pwc.co.uk/human-resource-services/assets/documents/diversity-
and-inclusion-reputation-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/3WF5-CCRK].
38. Brown, supra note 34.
39. Charge Statistics (Charges Filed with EEOC) FY 1997 Through FY 2017, U.S. 
EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N [hereinafter EEOC Charge Statistics],
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm [https://perma.cc/
3CZJ-DZKV ] (last visited Dec. 18, 2019).
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conflict in diverse workplaces, and many now feel uncomfortable 
with religious expression at work.40 
According to the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC), religious employment discrimination claims 
are on the rise.41  The EEOC charge statistics show that religious 
discrimination claims have doubled in the last twenty years and 
represent an increasing percentage of discrimination claims overall.42  
Since 2001, more than 20% of the complaints the EEOC investigates 
annually involve bias against Muslims, a group that makes up less 
than 2% of the population.43  According to one survey, 54% of all 
workers believe that Muslims face a lot of discrimination in the 
workplace, and 55% of atheists say they face a lot of discrimination 
in the workplace.44 
The rise in discrimination claims corresponds with anecdotal 
reports by American workers: with religious diversity comes more 
religious conflict.45  Approximately one in five workers reports 
religious conflict in highly diverse or moderately diverse 
workplaces.46  Additionally, 23% of all workers in highly diverse 
environments report witnessing or experiencing conflict between 
religious and LGBT co-workers, compared to just 7% of workers in 
minimally diverse environments.47   
With this potential for conflict, many people are becoming less 
comfortable about religious expression in the workplace.48  Although 
nearly 9-in-10 white evangelical employees are “somewhat or very 
comfortable” when the issue of religion comes up at work, 43% of 
nonbelievers are “somewhat or very uncomfortable.”49  Yet, a work 
40. Brown, supra note 34.
41. EEOC Charge Statistics, supra note 39.
42. Id.
43. Brown, supra note 34.
44. TANENBAUM CTR. FOR INTERRELIGIOUS UNDERSTANDING, WHAT AMERICAN WORKERS
REALLY THINK ABOUT RELIGION: TANENBAUM’S 2013 SURVEY OF AMERICAN
WORKERS AND RELIGION 8 (2013) [hereinafter TANENBAUM],
https://tanenbaum.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Tanenbaums-2013-Survey-of-
American-Workers-and-Religion.pdf [https://perma.cc/77NF-K3ZS].
45. Religion in Workplace Increasingly Diverse: Comes with Potential Pitfalls,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 1, 2013) [hereinafter HUFFINGTON POST],
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/01/diversity-religion-workplace-increasing
_n_3846021.html [https://perma.cc/927R-QA2K].
46. TANENBAUM, supra note 44, at 19.
47. Id.
48. See id. at 16–17.
49. See HUFFINGTON POST, supra note 45.
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environment that suppresses religious expression can spell trouble for 
the employer.50 
III. TITLE VII
Title VII requires businesses to make reasonable accommodations
for their employees’ religious practices unless undue hardship will 
result.51  Religious expression is considered a religious practice when 
an employee sincerely believes his or her religion requires it.52  
Generally, accommodating the need for religious expression means 
allowing it.53 
A. Protection for Religious Practices
When Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII
treated religion the same as the other protected categories of race, 
color, sex, and national origin.54  Discrimination based on religious 
beliefs or status was prohibited, but the law was silent about 
accommodating religious practices.55  Beginning in 1967, EEOC 
Guidelines required accommodation of a religious practice unless it 
would result in “undue hardship” to the employer, but courts refused 
to follow these guidelines.56 
After several federal courts held that employers who refused to 
accommodate religious practices were not discriminating on the basis 
of religion,57 Congress, led by Senator Jennings Randolph of West 
Virginia, overwhelmingly approved an amendment to Title VII in 
50. See James M. Oleske, Jr., Federalism, Free Exercise, and Title VII: Reconsidering
Reasonable Accommodation, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 525, 531–32 (2004).
51. Id. at 532.
52. See EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2032 (2015).
53. See Thomas D. Brierton, “Reasonable Accommodation” Under Title VII: Is It
Reasonable to the Religious Employee?, 42 CATH. LAW. 165, 168–69 (2002).
54. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(a)–(e), 78 Stat. 241, 255–56
(1964) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (2012)).
55. See id. § 201, 78 Stat. at 243.
56. See 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1968); see, e.g., Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co., 429 F.2d 324,
330 (6th Cir. 1970), aff’d, 402 U.S. 689 (1971); see, e.g., Riley v. Bendix Corp., 330
F. Supp. 583, 590–91 (M.D. Fla. 1971), rev’d, 464 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1972).  See
Kaminer, supra note 1, at 459; Brierton, supra note 53, at 167–68; and Oleske, supra
note 50, at 532, for a discussion of numerous courts refusing to follow the EEOC’s
guidelines.
57. Jamie Darin Prenkert & Julie Manning Magid, A Hobson’s Choice Model for
Religious Accommodation, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 467, 474 (2006).
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1972.58  To “save employees the pain of having to choose between 
their religions and their jobs,”59 the statutory definition of religion 
was broadened to include “all aspects of religious observance and 
practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is 
unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s . . . religious 
observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the 
employer’s business.”60  Observant employees with religious needs 
throughout the day were to be welcomed into the secular working 
world.61 
Title VII, as amended, is not aimed at neutrality toward religion.62  
Accommodation requires special treatment; an employer cannot 
avoid its obligations by treating everyone equally.63  Title VII 
elevates the religious needs of employees, even if coworkers may 
58. See Riley, 464 F.2d at 1116–17; see generally 118 CONG. REC. 705–06 (1972)
(statement of Sen. Randolph) (stating that freedom of religion is a fundamental right
in America, and freedom includes being able to fully observe one’s religion).
59. Prenkert & Magid, supra note 57, at 475–76.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2006); see also Sturgill v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 512 F.3d
1024, 1029–30 (8th Cir. 2008); see also Bush v. Regis Corp., 257 Fed. App’x. 219,
221 (11th Cir. 2007).
61. Symposium, Religion in the Workplace: Proceedings of the 2000 Annual Meeting of
the Association of American Law Schools Section on Law and Religion, 4 EMPL. RTS. 
& EMPLOY. POL’Y J. 87, 98 (2000).
Title VII helps to prevent religious workers from being forced to 
divide lives into rigidly separate identities—one private and 
religious, the other public and secular—as if religion were 
something that only goes on certain days of the week, certain 
times of the day, only in the privacy of your home or in places 
like churches and synagogues.  Title VII reflects a vision of 
religious life in which a Jew is able to be a Jew seven days a 
week, in which Christians can be Christians throughout their day, 
and Muslims observe their faith at work as well as at home. 
Believers of all stripes can let the Lord be Lord of their entire 
lives and not just Lord of their private lives. 
Id.  
62. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2034 (2015).
Title VII does not demand mere neutrality with regard to religious 
practices—that they be treated no worse than other practices. 
Rather, it gives them favored treatment, affirmatively obligating 
employers not to “fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual 
... because of such individual’s” “religious observance and 
practice.”. . . Title VII requires otherwise-neutral policies to give 
way to the need for an accommodation.  
Id. 
63. See Oleske, supra note 50, at 534–35, 554.
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feel slighted.64  “[C]ourts have largely rejected defenses that are 
based on ‘hypothetical morale problems’ or ‘proof that employees 
would grumble.’ . . . Title VII . . . requires employers to provide 
religion with ‘preferential treatment’ in ‘some circumstances.’”65  
Absent undue hardship, failing to reasonably accommodate the 
religious observances or practices of an employee is considered 
discrimination on the basis of religion and subjects an employer to 
Title VII liability.66  The 1972 amendment, however, did not define 
“reasonable accommodation” or “undue hardship.”67  Legislative 
efforts to codify federal accommodation law have largely failed,68 but 
EEOC guidelines issued in 1980 remain in effect today.69  The 
burden of undue hardship is measured using considerations like: the 
size of the employer, the number of employees requiring 
accommodation, and the operating costs of the employer.70  
Employers cannot claim undue hardship by simply assuming that too 
many coworkers will want the same accommodation.71  On the other 
hand, cases make clear that “[c]onsidering an accommodation’s 
impact on both the employer and coworkers . . . is appropriate when 
determining its reasonableness.”72 
The extent of the obligation to accommodate religion has 
engendered much disagreement since the 1972 amendment and the 
1980 EEOC Guidelines.73  Terms such as undue hardship and 
reasonably accommodate are intentionally imprecise to take into 
64. Id. at 534–35.
65. Id.
66. Davis v. Fort Bend County, 765 F.3d 480, 485 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 
2000e(j), 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012)).  In Davis, the court stated that to establish a prima
facie case, the plaintiff must “present evidence that (1) she held a bona fide religious
belief, (2) her belief conflicted with a requirement of her employment, (3) her
employer was informed of her belief, and (4) she suffered an adverse employment
action for failing to comply with the conflicting employment requirement.”  Id. at 485
(quoting Tagore v. United States, 735 F.3d 324, 329 (5th Cir. 2013)); see also Knight
v. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 275 F.3d 156, 168 (2d Cir. 2001) (explaining that an
employee must request the accommodation because employers are not expected to
know the religious practices of every employee).
67. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 73–75 (1977).
68. Flake, supra note 1, at 709–10.
69. Id. at 715–16.
70. Id. at 715; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(e)(1) (2017).
71. Flake, supra note 1, at 715; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(c)(1).
72. EEOC v. Firestone Fibers & Textiles Co., 515 F.3d 307, 314 (4th Cir. 2008); see also
Knight v. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 275 F.3d 156, 168 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that
the accommodation sought by the employees was not reasonable due to the burden it
would place on the employer).
73. Flake, supra note 1, at 719.
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account the secular pressures on businesses; questions are fact-
intensive and depend on individual circumstances.74  
B. Religious Expression Is Protected Activity
For many, the term “religious observances or practices” calls to
mind behaviors such as attending organized services, resting on the 
Sabbath, adhering to dietary restrictions, and praying.75  Expression, 
however, can be a form of religious observance or practice.76  The 
law recognizes that some religious adherents are obliged to 
proselytize.77  Other forms of expression like posters, buttons, 
figurines, and artwork may be required as well.78  It makes no 
difference that a particular type of religious expression is not 
ordinarily associated with the organized version of the employee’s 
religion.79  The employee’s religious need to express, even if shared 
by no one else in the world, is entitled to protection if it is sincere.80   
Title VII has been invoked to protect a religious need for 
expressive displays.81  Wilson v. United States West Communications 
involved a worker who took a religious vow to wear a large button 
with a photograph of an aborted fetus except when she was sleeping 
or showering.82  She was told not to come to work with the button on, 
sent home when she reported to work wearing it, and then fired for 
her unexcused absence.83  In the ensuing action, the court recognized 
that this expressive activity was a religious practice entitled to some 
form of accommodation under Title VII absent undue hardship.84 
74. Firestone Fibers & Textiles Co., 515 F.3d at 313.
75. See U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL NO. 
915.003, at 9 (2008) [hereinafter EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL].
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., Knight, 275 F.3d at 167–68 (explaining that evangelizing may be a
requirement under some religions).
78. See infra notes 81–93 and accompanying text.
79. Walter Olson, A Hijab and a Hunch: Abercrombie and the Limits of Religious
Accommodation, 2014–2015 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 139, 144.
80. Id. at 150 (“As the EEOC’s compliance manual noted, Title VII protects a religious
belief or practice that may happen to arise ‘in the person’s own scheme of things’ and
‘even if few—or no—other people adhere to it.’”).
81. See Questions and Answers: Religious Discrimination in the Workplace, U.S. EQUAL
EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/qanda_religion.html
[https://perma.cc/U28R-JWYJ] (last modified Jan. 31, 2011).
82. Wilson v. U.S. W. Commc’ns, 58 F.3d 1337, 1339 (8th Cir. 1995).
83. Id. at 1339–40.
84. Id. at 1340–42 (ruling that Wilson’s religious expression clearly required
accommodation, but the type of accommodations offered by her employer were
sufficient); see also Rivera v. Choice Courier Sys., Inc., No. 01 Civ. 2096 (CBM),
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A need to display inspirational artwork is also a religious practice 
covered by Title VII.85  In Dixon v. Hallmark Cos., the plaintiffs 
“presented evidence that they [were] sincere, committed Christians 
who oppose[d] efforts to remove God from public places.”86  The 
couple was fired from an apartment complex management office for 
refusing to remove a twenty-six-inch by fifty-inch poster with the 
words, “Remember the Lilies… Matthew 6:28.”87  The Eleventh 
Circuit reversed a summary judgment against the couple, holding 
they had established a prima facie case of discrimination, and the 
employer had failed to present any evidence of accommodation or 
undue hardship.88   
In a similar case, Brown v. Polk County, a county worker was told 
he had to remove three prayer plaques from his office (“God, grant 
me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change, the courage to 
change the things I can, and the wisdom to know the difference”; 
“God be in my life and in my commitment”; and the Lord’s Prayer) 
because they might be considered “offensive to employees.”89  Upon 
termination for refusing to remove the plaques, the employee sued 
the county, alleging religious discrimination.90  Because the county 
made no effort to accommodate the employee’s religious needs, the 
Eighth Circuit held that the county could only prevail if it proved that 
an accommodation would be unduly burdensome.91 
Courts agree that buttons, posters, and other non-speech forms of 
religious expression are the types of religious observances and 
practices covered by Title VII.92  When a sincere religious belief 
requires the expression, Title VII is implicated, and the employer 
must accommodate the expression absent undue hardship.93 
C. How Much Accommodation?
The more difficult question is how much an employer must do to
accommodate religion.94  Not very much, courts have often held; 
2004 WL 1444852, at *2–3,*5 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2004) (noting that plaintiff, a 
courier, was fired for refusing to remove a “Jesus is Lord” badge). 
85. See Questions and Answers: Religious Discrimination in the Workplace, supra note
81.
86. Dixon v. Hallmark Cos., 627 F.3d 849, 855 (11th Cir. 2010).
87. Id. at 853.
88. Id. at 856.
89. Brown v. Polk County, 61 F.3d 650, 659 (8th Cir. 1995).
90. Id. at 653.
91. Id. at 654.
92. See supra notes 76–91 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 76–91 and accompanying text.
94. See Brierton, supra note 53, at 165.
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businesses are not required to expend more than a de minimis amount 
to accommodate religious practices.95  Since accommodating 
employee expression generally does not involve any expense at all,96 
however, religious expression usually must be permitted unless it 
causes undue hardship in a nonmonetary way.97 
The Title VII requirement to accommodate the religious practices 
of an employee is far from absolute.98  “Congress recognized that 
because of business necessity and the legitimate rights of other 
employees, it could ‘not impose a duty on the employer to 
accommodate at all costs;’”99 thus, an exception was written into the 
statute for “undue hardship” to the employer.100  In interpreting the 
“undue hardship” language, courts have been sympathetic to 
employers in the religious accommodation context.101  A hardship is 
considered “undue” if it requires the expenditure of more than a de 
minimis amount.102 
The de minimis standard was introduced in 1977 in Trans World 
Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, a Sabbath work shift case.103  A junior 
worker required accommodation to observe the Sabbath, but the 
Supreme Court was concerned with extra overtime expense to the 
95. Id. at 191.
96. See Thomas C. Berg, Religious Speech in the Workplace: Harassment or Protected
Speech?, 22 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 959, 1007 (1999) (discussing examples, such
as work bulletin boards or expressions written on pay checks, where accommodation
imposes minimal to no cost for the employer).
97. See infra Part IV.
98. See infra notes 99–106 and accompanying text.
99. EEOC v. Firestone Fibers & Textiles Co., 515 F.3d 307, 313 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 70 (1986)).
100. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012).
101. See Brierton, supra note 53, at 191–92.
102. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84–85 (1977).
 If most human resources managers experience disability 
accommodation as far more of a headache than religious 
accommodation, one reason lies in the way courts have 
interpreted the two statutes in starkly different fashions.  One key 
term that appears in both areas of law—“undue hardship” to an 
employer—gets defined in almost comically opposite ways.  In 
disability accommodation, courts routinely refuse to find undue 
hardship even when employers have been battered by the cost, 
disruption, and inconvenience of trying to accommodate a worker. 
In religious accommodation, by contrast, they follow a de minimis 
standard; even a little bit of employer cost, disruption, or 
inconvenience is undue. 
Olson, supra note 79, at 157. 
103. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 432 U.S. at 84–85.
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employer and the effects on coworkers under a collective bargaining 
agreement and seniority system.104  Subsequent cases echoed these 
concerns about coworkers in addressing what was deemed de 
minimis and, thus, reasonable.105  As one court said, “Considering an 
accommodation’s impact, on both the employer and coworkers . . . is 
appropriate when determining its reasonableness.”106   
Most cases on the effects of religious accommodation on 
coworkers, like Trans World Airlines, focus on employees who 
refuse shifts on the Sabbath,107 but religious expression cases are 
distinguishable from them.108  Allowing expression implies no out-
of-pocket cost to the employer, and coworkers are not required to 
step in and cover.109  If an employer has a no-poster rule, how much 
could it cost to waive the prohibition to accommodate an employee 
with a religious need for an inspirational poster?110  Undue hardship, 
however, need not be financial; there are other forms of hardship.111  
The rule would have to be to allow the religious expression unless 
something about it results in one of these nonmonetary forms of 
undue hardship.112 
IV. TYPES OF HARDSHIP
Allowing employers an opening to prove undue hardship
distinguishes religious practice accommodation from other 
prohibitions against employment discrimination.113  In this section, 
104. Id.
105. See EEOC v. Firestone Fibers & Textiles Co., 515 F.3d 307, 314 (4th Cir. 2008).
106. Id.
107. Kaminer, supra note 1, at 87; Trans World Airlines, Inc., 432 U.S. at 84–85; Sturgill
v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 512 F.3d 1024, 1027 (8th Cir. 2008); Tepper v. Potter,
505 F.3d 508, 511 (6th Cir. 2007); Smith v. Pyro Mining Co., 827 F.2d 1081, 1083–
84 (6th Cir. 1987); Brown v. Gen. Motors Corp., 601 F.2d 956, 957–59 (8th Cir.
1979); Minkus v. Metro. Sanitary Dist. of Greater Chi., 600 F.2d 80, 80–81 (7th Cir.
1979).
108. See Berg, supra note 96, at 977.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. Farah v. A-1 Careers, No. 12-2692-SAC, 2013 WL 6095118, at *8 (D. Kan. Nov. 20,
2013) (quoting Beadle v. City of Tampa, 42 F.3d 633, 636 (11th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 515 U.S. 1152 (1995)); EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 75, at 46.
112. See supra notes 94–111 and accompanying text.
113. Employers cannot claim it would be a hardship to hire African-Americans, Jews,
Mexican-Americans, or women, for example, because customers would likely take
offense.  Mayale-Eke v. Merrill Lynch, 754 F. Supp. 2d 372, 381 (D.R.I. 2010); cf.
King v. Kirkland’s Stores Inc., No. 2:04-CV-1055-MEF, 2006 WL 2239208, at *7–8,
*14 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 4, 2006) (assuming, sub silentio, that firing on the basis of race
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the article explores the types of hardship employers can suffer if they 
are required to accommodate religious expression.114  Religious 
displays can cause hardship to employers in at least four ways.115  
First, they can offend customers.116  Second, they can be so 
distracting that they affect productivity.117  Third, religious 
expression can infringe on the rights of other employees to be free 
from religious harassment.118  And fourth, there is a danger that 
religious displays will be misattributed to employers or to coworkers 
sharing space.119 
A. Customer Reaction
Religious expression and displays can lead to customer
complaints.120  Courts have sided with employers when employees 
attempt to spread their religion to customers,121 particularly when the 
customers object.122  Similarly, courts have been concerned with the 
because a customer complained that too many African-Americans were working at a 
store would violate Title VII). 
114. See infra Sections IV.A–D.
115. See infra Sections IV.A–D.
116. See infra Section IV.A.
117. See infra Section IV.B.
118. See infra Section IV.C.
119. See infra Section IV.D.
120. See infra notes 121–24 and accompanying text.
121. See Knight v. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 275 F.3d 156, 164–65 (2d Cir. 2001).
Public employers are in a particularly precarious position.  See Tucker v. Cal. Dep’t
of Educ., 97 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 1996).  They run afoul of the First Amendment
when they prohibit speech, but they risk violating the Establishment Clause when the
speech involves religion.  Id.  The courts are not particularly sympathetic.  Id.  When
supervisors at the California Department of Education issued orders prohibiting
“employees in [a religious plaintiff’s] division from engaging in any oral or written
religious advocacy in the workplace and displaying any religious artifacts, tracts or
materials outside their offices or cubicles,” the rules were held to be overbroad and
summary judgment was granted to the employee.  Id.
122. In Knight, a state employer of sign language interpreters was not required to permit
the interpreters to evangelize to clients as an accommodation.  Knight, 275 F.3d at
164–65.
Here the state showed permitting religious speech when working 
with clients was and would continue to be disruptive, and that 
disruption outweighed appellants’ free speech interests.  Because 
appellants’ jobs both require a great deal of public contact, the 
state has a significant interest in regulating speech related to that 
contact.  Knight’s clients were so upset by her religious speech 
they brought legal action against the state and Knight personally. 
Wilson testified Quental’s interpreting client was upset and 
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effect on business when an employee wears religious symbols in a 
manner considered offensive.123  For example, a Wal-Mart employee 
whose “Universal Belief System” compelled him to wear various 
pieces of religious attire, including a priest’s shirt and collar, a beret 
and a court jester hat, a kaffiyeh (Muslim headdress), a fanny pack 
with an anarchy symbol, a chain with multiple crosses hanging from 
it, and a necklace with a crucifix, was the subject of customer and 
coworker complaints.124   
B. Employee Distraction
Expressive rituals can also cause undue hardship to an employer
because they distract other employees.125  Since religious practices 
need not be mandated by any broadly-subscribed, organized religion, 
Title VII applies to any requirement for expression borne of a sincere 
religious belief, even if self-styled, self-imposed, and unique to the 
employee, no matter how unusual.126  What if an employee has a 
sincere belief that he must play religious music at earsplitting 
volume?127   
Title VII does not contemplate an unlimited right to religious 
expression.128  “Although the law is still developing in this area and 
remains unclear . . . an employer may restrict” religious expression if 
it “disrupts or is expected to interfere with the operations of other 
employees . . . .”129  The EEOC Guidelines permit employers to 
“consider the potential disruption, if any, that will be posed by 
permitting [an] expression of religious belief.”130  Past disruption or 
agitated by Quental’s religious speech.  Prohibiting discrimination 
against an employee’s speech does not require employers to 
accept speech “that impedes an employee’s performance of [her] 
duties.”  Thus, the harmful side effects of the use of religious 
speech with a client “outweigh its benefits to the speaker-
employee,” so that “the employer is justified in taking adverse 
action against the employee in order to mitigate the negative 
effects.” 
Id. (citations omitted). 
123. See Lorenz v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. SA-05-CA-0319 OG (NN), 2006 WL
1562235, at *2–3 (W.D. Tex. May 24, 2006), aff’d, 225 F. App’x 302 (5th Cir. 2007).
124. Id.
125. See infra notes 126–31 and accompanying text.
126. See discussion supra Section III.B.
127. See infra notes 128–31 and accompanying text.
128. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 75, at 56–58.
129. Ghumman et al., supra note 1, at 450.
130. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 75, at 77; see Farah v. A-1 Careers, No. 12-
2692-SAC, 2013 WL 6095118, at *8 (D. Kan. Nov. 20, 2013).
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reasonably expected disruption to coworkers, customers, or business 
operations are valid considerations.131   
C. Protection of Freedom from Religious Harassment
In some cases, coworkers may view religious expression as
harassment.132  Standing squarely against an employee’s Title VII 
right to religious expression is another employee’s right, also under 
Title VII, not to be religiously harassed.133  “[R]eligious expression 
(displaying religious pictures, posters, or messages within a 
workstation) becomes a challenge for many employers because they 
must balance religious accommodation obligations with disparate 
treatment and harassment issues.”134  No one has a right under Title 
VII to harass others;135 “[a]n employer need not accommodate an 
employee’s religious practice by violating other laws.”136 
Blindly accommodating a religious need to express may leave the 
employer vulnerable to a religious harassment suit by other 
employees.137  The Supreme Court has interpreted Title VII to 
include a requirement that employers provide a workplace free of 
harassment based upon a protected category.138  The employee 
claiming harassment is required to “show that the harassment was: 
(1) based on his religion; (2) unwelcome; (3) sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of employment by creating an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and, (4) that
there is a basis for employer liability.”139  In a case alleging the
harassment came from a coworker, “an employer is liable if it knew
131. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 75, at 77; see Farah, 2013 WL 6095118, at
*8.
132. See infra notes 133–60 and accompanying text.
133. Laura Fleming, Christmas Trees and Religious Accommodation, ORANGE COUNTY L., 
Dec. 2006, at 10–11 (2006) (“[Using] the workplace as a forum for evangelism
exposes the employer to possible suits by other employees for violation of their
religious freedom rights or for religious harassment.”); Ng v. Jacobs Eng’g Grp., No.
B185838, 2006 WL 2942738, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 16 2006) (“Complaints from
plaintiff’s coworkers regarding her proselytizing activities in the workplace exposed
defendant to potential liability for religious harassment claims by the coworkers if
plaintiff were allowed to continue her proselytizing.”).
134. Ghumman et al., supra note 1, at 450.
135. See EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 75, at 43.
136. Tagore v. United States, 735 F.3d 324, 329 (5th Cir. 2013).
137. See EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 75, at 43–44.
138. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65–67 (1986) (stating that a hostile
environment created by sexual harassment is actionable).
139. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 75, at 31.
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or should have known about the harassment and failed to take 
immediate and appropriate corrective action.”140 
When is religious expression harassment?141  The easy cases are 
threats to act against an individual because of his religion, continued 
unwelcome speech after the speaker has been asked to stop, and 
simple insults or epithets.142  Harder cases involve supervisor speech, 
non-hostile proselytizing speech that disturbs, and accumulated 
religious speech.143   
Coworkers may allege harassment from religious expression, but 
courts have given employers inconsistent guidance about what 
constitutes harassment.144 
 Some employees wish to – or believe their religion 
requires them to – express their religious beliefs at work by, 
for example, posting religious messages in their workspace, 
using religious language (such as “Praise the Lord”) when 
communicating with others, or attempting to proselytize 
coworkers . . . . Court decisions are not entirely clear . . . 
when an employee professing his or her faith crosses the 
line to become a harasser.  Some courts have held that an 
employer has no duty to accommodate an employee’s 
religious expression when it could constitute harassment 
against other employees or it contravenes the employer’s 
diversity or nondiscrimination policies.  Other courts have 
found in the religious employee’s favor if his or her 
140. Id. at 39.
141. See infra notes 142–60 and accompanying text.
142. Berg, supra note 96, at 985–86.
143. Id. at 987–88, 991.
144. “The impact that proselytizing has on employee morale and productivity . . . requires
a fact-bound analysis.  The precedent indicates that the courts are largely sympathetic
to employers when they present evidence that proselytizing will endanger productivity
or provoke harassment claims from co-workers.”  Wolf, supra note 1, at 132.
When proselytizing provokes complaints from other employees or 
from customers, most courts will find that the probability of a loss 
in productivity, an adverse impact on customer relations, or the 
filing of a harassment claim will be sufficient to satisfy the 
employer’s burden of proving why an accommodation was not 
possible.  To the extent that employers have failed to meet this 
burden, it is usually because the proselytizing was 
nonconfrontational and the employer’s evidence was too 
speculative to prove that proselytizing was likely to result in an 
actual adverse consequence.  A knee-jerk reaction by an employer 
is the surest way to lose a proselytizing case.  
Id. at 133. 
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behavior was merely annoying or created discomfort for 
others.  Clearly, the more persistent and intense an 
employee is about expressing religious views at work, the 
more likely other workers are to feel harassed.145  
“Title VII does not require an employer to allow an employee to 
impose [his or her] religious views on others.”146  Such a requirement 
“would . . . work[] an undue hardship.”147  A claim of harassment, 
however, must be reasonable and justified.148  Employees ultra-
145. Lisa Guerin, Workplace Harassment Based on Religion, NOLO.COM,
http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/workplace-harassment-based-religion.html
[https://perma.cc/7GH4-EYJD] (last visited Dec. 18, 2019).  “With respect to
employees who wish to proselytize in the workplace, an employer is . . . deemed to
suffer an undue hardship whenever an accommodation risks creating a hostile work
environment or alienating customers.”  Wolf, supra note 1, at 131; see Chalmers v.
Tulon Co. of Richmond, 101 F.3d 1012 (4th Cir. 1996); see Johnson v. Halls Merch.,
Inc., No. 87-1042-CV-W-9, 1989 WL 23201, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 17, 1989).
146. Averett v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., No. 2:07-cv-1167, 2010 WL 522826, at *10
(S.D. Ohio Feb. 9, 2010) (quoting Wilson v. U.S. W. Commc’ns, 58 F.3d 1337,1342
(8th Cir. 1995).
Complaints from plaintiff’s coworkers regarding her proselytizing 
activities in the workplace exposed defendant to potential liability 
for religious harassment claims by the coworkers if plaintiff were 
allowed to continue her proselytizing.  The court concluded that . . 
. defendant was not required to permit an employee to impose her 
religious views on other employees or to allow its facilities to be 
used for religious purposes. 
Ng v. Jacobs Eng’g Grp., No. B185838, 2006 WL 2942739, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 
16, 2006). 
147. Ng, 2006 WL 2942739, at *8.
148. Kaminer, supra note 1, at 111, 120.
[T]he courts have tended to look at whether the complaints or
disruptive behavior in response to the religious speech is
reasonable or justified.  This in turn is based upon whether the
court determines that the religious expression in question is
objectively harassing, thus following the Harris court’s
determination that “[c]onduct that is not severe or pervasive
enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work
environment—an environment that a reasonable person would
find hostile or abusive—is beyond Title VII’s purview.”
. . . . 
. . . [C]ourts . . . hold[] that speech which is objectively harassing 
to a reasonable person does not have to be accommodated under 
section 701(j).  This has led courts to discriminate against unusual 
or uncommon religious speech.  Therefore, the lower courts have 
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sensitive to any mention of religion cannot be permitted to silence 
their coworkers.149   
In an expansive and healthy workplace, workers are free to 
express religious views, as they do views on traditional 
American topics of conversation: politics, sports, and 
family, to name a few.  Religious garb or prayer breaks can 
be met, not with suspicion of coercion, but with the 
openness that accompanies culturally acceptable identities, 
such as being married with children, or an animal lover, or a 
rabid fan for a particular baseball team.  Although a single 
worker might feel devalued with prominent photographic 
displays of spouses and children, a mother of six children 
might feel slighted by a population-control advocate, an 
animal lover might be horrified by a hunting aficionado, and 
a Mets fan might dislike the overbearing Yankees fan with 
excessive team paraphernalia, one set of these workers does 
not get to control the workplace to prohibit the other’s 
determined that religious employees have the right to greet 
customers with phrases such as “God bless you” and “Praise the 
Lord,” or on occasion read Biblical passages at meetings, but can 
be prohibited from prefacing virtually every sentence with the 
phrase “In the name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth,” or continually 
wearing an uncovered anti-abortion button containing a graphic 
photograph of an aborted fetus.   
 Id. 
149. See Nantiya Ruan, Accommodating Respectful Religious Expression in the
Workplace, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 29–30 (2008).
[C]ourts have never recognized an “upset coworker” exception to
anti-discrimination laws, even to accommodation mandates.
Rejecting religious accommodation because coworkers are upset
is no more justified than letting coworker preferences trump
requirements of disability accommodations, medical leave, anti-
harassment policies, etc.  This argument against a “coworker
veto” does not diminish the point . . . that religious expression that
is aimed at demeaning secularist workers should not be protected
or accommodated. . . . [C]ourts will have to balance the rights of
religious expression with the rights of other workers to be free
from harassment.
Id. 
[T]he negative reactions of other employees per se [cannot]
suffice to justify restricting an employee’s speech.  Such a
doctrine does not provide adequate protection under Title VII for
religious speech.  After all, as other commentators have noted, an
employer can in no way justify a refusal to hire blacks or women
on the ground that hiring them would disturb other employees.
Berg, supra note 96, at 978–79. 
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expression.  Likewise, secularist workers should not have 
the ability to silence religiously observant workers.150 
Discussing or expressing religion should not be taboo in the 
workplace, but unwelcome religious criticism directed at individual 
employees is considered harassment.151  When an employee 
distressed her supervisor and a subordinate with letters criticizing 
their personal lives and telling them to ask God for forgiveness, it 
was ruled harassment.152  Similarly, a Walmart employee was 
harassing others when a co-worker “reported that [plaintiff] was 
‘screaming over her’ that God does not accept gays, they should not 
‘be on earth,’ and they will ‘go to hell’ because they are not ‘right in 
the head.’  Five other employees confirmed that [plaintiff] said that 
gays are sinners and are going to hell.”153  Frightening coworkers can 
also be harassment.154  For example, an employee who scared 
coworkers with her calculation of the date of the end of the world 
was considered harassing.155  Additionally, threatening religious 
language may be harassment.156 
Most agree that posting religious sayings in one’s own cubicle does 
not violate Title VII157 as long as they “do not demean other religious 
views.”158  Similarly, allowing nonverbal religious expression at the 
workplace, such as religious jewelry, statues, or symbols, does not 
create a hostile work environment for coworkers.159  Permitting 
150. Ruan, supra note 149, at 30–31.
[F]ear alone, even fear of discrimination or other illegal activity,
is not enough to justify such a mobilization of governmental force
against [a religion-expressing employee].  The fear must be
substantial and, above all, objectively reasonable.  A phobia of
religion, for instance, no matter how real subjectively, will not do.
As Justice Brandeis has said, rather starkly, “Men feared witches
and burnt women.”
Brown v. Polk County, 61 F.3d 650, 659 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Whitney v. 
California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)). 
151. Ng, 2006 WL 2942739, at *6–7.
152. Chalmers v. Tulon Co. of Richmond, 101 F.3d 1012, 1015–16, 1021 (4th Cir. 1996).
153. Matthews v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 417 F. App’x 552, 553, 555 (7th Cir. 2011).
154. Mitchell v. Univ. Med. Ctr., Inc., No. 3:07CV-414-H, 2010 WL 3155842, at *2, *7
(W.D. Ky. Aug. 9, 2010).
155. Id.
156. Averett v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., No. 2:07-cv-1167, 2010 WL 522826, at *8–9
(S.D. Ohio Feb. 9, 2010).
157. See Powell v. Yellow Book USA, Inc., 445 F.3d 1074, 1076–78 (8th Cir. 2006).
158. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 75, at 39.
159. Kaminer, supra note 1, at 140.
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religious symbols that are demeaning or frightening, however, can be 
harassment.160   
D. Possibility of Misattribution
Cases and literature involving religious displays are scarce.161
Generally, one worker’s religious display would not annoy another in 
the same way as persistent speech.162  However, displays are 
sometimes objectionable on an entirely different ground: the 
possibility of misattribution.163  Depending on where they are placed, 
an employee’s religious artwork and articles can be misunderstood to 
express the views of an employer or coworker.164  This is the 
rationale behind many public employer Establishment Clause 
cases.165 
1. Misattribution to Employer
Title VII protection for religious expression does not extend so far
that an employer must risk appearing to adopt the message on its own 
behalf.166  “Regardless of whether the client objects, a religiously 
oriented expression may be an undue hardship for an employer when 
the expression could be mistaken as the employer’s message.”167  
Religious displays present an even greater risk of misattribution than 
employee speech.168  The question is whether a reasonable observer 
would understand the religious message of an employee as emanating 
from the employer.169   
160. See Swartzentruber v. Gunite Corp., 99 F. Supp. 2d 976, 978 (N.D. Ind. 2000)
(discussing burning a cross as a religious symbol); see Kaushal v. Hyatt Regency
Woodfield, No. 98 C 4834, 1999 WL 436585, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 22, 1999)
(discussing a swastika as a religious symbol).
161. See, e.g., George W. Dent, Jr., Religious Children, Secular Schools, 61 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 863, 885–86 (1988).
162. See Berg, supra note 96, at 971.
163. See discussion infra Sections IV.D.1–2.
164. See discussion infra Sections IV.D.1–2.
165. See discussion infra Section IV.D.1
166. See Religious Accommodation: Do We Have to Allow Employees to Proselytize or
Use Religious Expressions/Greetings?, SOC’Y HUMAN RES. MGMT., https://www.shrm
.org/resourcesandtools/tools-and-samples/hr-qa/pages/religios-accommodation--do-
wehave-to-allow-employees-to-proselytize-or-use-religious-expressions-
greetings.aspx [https://perma.cc/R9DN-FAWQ] (last visited Dec. 18, 2019).
167. Id.; see also EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 75, at 79–80.
168. See Tucker v. Cal. Dep’t of Educ., 97 F.3d 1204, 1214 (9th Cir. 1996).
169. See id. at 1213.
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Compliance with Title VII must not interfere with the right of an 
employer to control its own message.170  A company has First 
Amendment rights, and Title VII cannot be used to prevent it from 
expressing its own views.171  An employer is entitled to “decide what 
viewpoints to espouse in its own speech or speech that might be 
attributed to it.”172     
For public employers, the Establishment Clause compounds the 
problem:   
[O]n issues of religion in the workplace, public-sector
employers are distinctively whipsawed by multiple sources
of liability.  On display of religious symbols at a workplace,
for example, they may have to contend with possible
liability under the First Amendment (if, say, they restrict
employees’ speech improperly) and the Establishment
Clause (if, say, they give the impression of endorsing that
same speech).173
As difficult as walking this line between the two First Amendment 
clauses can be, “Title VII liability for not accommodating 
employees’ religious practices—an exposure they share with private 
employers—then gets layered on top.”174   
2. Misattribution to Coworker
When two coworkers share a cubicle or office, posters or religious
symbols placed in that space by one can be viewed as the expression 
of the other.175  If Office Mate A hangs a poster on a shared wall that 
says, “I worship pumpernickel,” Office Mate B may not object to the 
artwork on harassment grounds or be offended by it.176  The problem 
is that it will create a false impression that the poster represents the 
views of both occupants of the office.177  Office Mate B’s name and 
reputation can be affected by misattribution of religious artwork or 
170. See Loren F. Selznick, Walking the Executive Speech Tightrope: From Starbucks to
Chick-fil-A, 65 OKLA. L. REV. 573, 600 (2013).
171. Id.; see Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 342–43 (2010).
172. See In re Kendall, 712 F.3d 814, 825 (3d Cir. 2013).
173. Olson, supra note 79, at 151.
174. See id.
175. See Powell v. Yellow Book USA, Inc., 445 F.3d 1074, 1077–78 (8th Cir. 2006); see
Ruan, supra note 149, at 6–7.
176. See Ruan, supra note 149, at 29–30.
177. See id. at 6–7; see also Powell, 445 F.3d at 1077–78.
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objects he does not believe in.178  Although the courts have not yet 
addressed this risk to coworkers sharing office space, they have 
deemed the risk worthy of concern to employers179 and have long 
protected individuals from the consequences of misattribution in a 
variety of contexts.180 
V. ACCOMMODATION, HARDSHIP, AND COMPROMISE
Even where there is undue hardship to the employer, the inquiry is
not at an end.181  Courts require an effort at compromise with the 
religious employee.182  For a compromise to be legally acceptable, it 
must satisfy the religious needs of the employee; however, the 
employer is not required to put up with undue hardship and the 
employee must show a willingness to bend.183  The possibility and 
nature of a compromise accommodation can depend on the type of 
hardship.184  
178. See King v. Allied Vision, Ltd., 807 F. Supp. 300, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part sub nom. King v. Innovation Books, 976 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1992).
179. See supra notes 175–78 and accompanying text.
180. “[P]ublicity that unreasonably places [another] in a false light before the public” is
considered an actionable invasion of privacy.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 
652A, 652E (West 1977); see, e.g., Krajewski v. Gusoff, 53 A.3d 793, 805–09 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2012).  Parade organizers are not required to include everyone because
“participation would likely be perceived as having resulted from the . . . customary
determination about a unit admitted to the parade, that its message was worthy of
presentation and quite possibly of support as well.”  Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian
& Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 575 (1995).  The Lanham Act prevents
one from passing off a product as originating from someone else (15 U.S.C. §
1125(a)(1)) and addresses the risk that an inferior product may be attributed to the one
falsely credited.  Richard Feiner & Co. v. Passport Int’l Prods., Inc., No. 97 Civ.
9144(RO), 1998 WL 437157, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 1998).  Falsely making a
document purporting to be the act of another is prosecuted as forgery.  See ARK. CODE
ANN. § 5-37-201(a)(1) (West 2019); see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 861(a)(2) (West
2019); see IOWA CODE ANN. § 715A.2(1)(b) (West 2019); see MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-
21-35 (West 2019); see TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-114(b)(1)(A)(i) (West 2019).
181. See Flake, supra note 1, at 701–02.
182. See id. at 717.
183. “A worker’s discrimination suit will almost certainly fail if it is shown that he refused
to cooperate with his employer in its efforts to find a suitable accommodation of his
religious beliefs and practices.”  RAYMOND F. GREGORY, ENCOUNTERING RELIGION IN
THE WORKPLACE: THE LEGAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF WORKERS AND
EMPLOYERS 204 (2011).
184. See infra Sections V.A–D.
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A. Accommodating when Customers Are Alienated
Customer response is supposedly factored into the reasonableness
equation.185  Of course, concern about negative customer reaction to 
the religion of an employee is a forbidden consideration under Title 
VII,186 but it is permissible to take customer response into account in 
assessing the reasonableness of an accommodation of religious 
practices or expression.187  That said, employers are entitled to more 
consistency than the courts have provided on accommodating for 
religious symbols and expression.188   
Religious exceptions to dress codes, for example, have been 
required in some cases and not others.189  Courts recognize that 
businesses use dress codes and uniforms to impress customers.190  
The Supreme Court, in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.,191 
however, held that a dress code with a no headwear policy had to 
185. Professor Flake argues for more deference to employers in proving image-based
hardships.  See Flake, supra note 1, at 751–52.
Absent a customer complaint about an employee’s religious 
expression, it is almost impossible for an employer to prove an 
accommodation damaged its image.  Unlike other types of 
hardship, damage to image is almost always intangible and, 
consequently, very difficult to measure.  It is easy to calculate the 
impact of paying overtime wages to an employee who works in 
place of a coworker observing the Sabbath.  But proving the 
adverse consequences of an employee saying “God bless you” to 
customers is far more difficult.  Unless an offended customer 
actually complains, there is no clear way to measure how an 
employee’s religious expression affects customers’ buying 
intentions, commitment, loyalty, or overall perception of the 
business.  The effect such expression has on how other 
stakeholders view an organization may be even more difficult to 
detect, although certainly no less significant. 
Id. 
186. See Mayale-Eke v. Merrill Lynch, 754 F. Supp. 2d 372, 381 (D.R.I. 2010); cf. King v.
Kirkland’s Stores Inc., No. 2:04-cv-1055-MEF, 2006 WL 2239203, at *1, *4 (M.D.
Ala. Aug. 4, 2006) (assuming, sub silentio, that firing on the basis of race because a
customer complained that too many African-Americans were working at a store
would violate Title VII).
187. See Flake, supra note 1, at 751–52.
188. “When courts well-versed in the nuances of Title VII reach conflicting decisions in
factually similar cases, it is unrealistic to expect employers to fare any better.”  Id. at
745.
189. See infra notes 190–97 and accompanying text.
190. Camara v. Epps Air Serv., Inc., 292 F. Supp. 3d 1314, 1318 (N.D. Ga. 2017).
191. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015).
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give way for a Muslim applicant’s need to wear a headscarf.192  Yet, 
in a subsequent case, a federal district court sided with an employer 
who accommodated employees with religious headwear by finding 
them positions that did not require uniforms.193  In the Wal-Mart case 
with the employee who came to work wearing a combination of 
religious symbols that offended customers, the store manager 
attempted an accommodation.194  The employee was permitted to 
wear a Muslim headdress alone, but he continued to wear the entire 
ensemble and, after several disciplinary actions and meetings, the 
employee was fired.195  The court found that in order to 
accommodate the employee, Walmart would have had to create an 
entirely new position for him away from both customers and 
coworkers.196  This was too much hardship.197     
The precedent on religious greetings could confound an employer 
trying to comply with Title VII.198  On the one hand, an 
accommodation for an office coordinator whose religion compelled 
her sporadic use of the phrase “Have a Blessed Day” was sufficient 
when the company only prevented her use of the phrase with 
customers.199  On the other hand, greeting food service customers 
with “God bless you” and “Praise the Lord” was entitled to 
accommodation as not unduly burdensome to another employer.200  
In a third case, any accommodation for an employee whose religion 
compelled her to “preface nearly every sentence she spoke with the 
phrase ‘In the name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth’” was held to be too 
burdensome.201 
B. Accommodating a Distracting Practice
Title VII does not require an employer to allow a religious
employee to distract coworkers by playing liturgical music at an 
192. Id. at 2034.
193. Camara, 292 F. Supp. 3d at 1328.
194. Lorenz v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. SA-05-CA-0319 OG (NN), 2006 WL 1562235,
at *9 (W.D. Tex. May 24, 2006), aff’d, 225 F. App’x 302 (5th Cir. 2007).
195. Id. at *3.
196. Id. at *10.
197. Id.
198. See infra notes 199–201 and accompanying text.
199. Anderson v. U.S.F. Logistics (IMC), Inc., 274 F.3d 470, 474, 477 (7th Cir. 2001).
200. Banks v. Serv. Am. Corp., 952 F. Supp. 703, 707, 710 (D. Kan. 1996) (reasoning that
no money would be lost because there was only a small number of customer
complaints).
201. Johnson v. Halls Merch., Inc., No. 87-1042-CV-W-9, 1989 WL 23201, at *2 (W.D.
Mo. Jan. 17, 1989).
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earsplitting volume.202  An employer is entitled to insist on an 
atmosphere of productivity and should be able to impose reasonable 
time, place, and manner restrictions to prevent coworker distraction, 
even if they interfere with religious practices.203  The employer is, 
however, required to explore possible accommodations that would 
not impede the work.204  Would the employee’s religious needs be 
satisfied if the music was confined to headphones?205  What if the 
employee offered to pay to soundproof a private office?206  Could the 
music playing be limited to certain times of day when other 
employees were not present?207  Could the music be played at a lower 
volume?208  Could the employee take breaks and listen to the music 
at full volume in the car?209  If the employee refuses every attempt at 
accommodation and insists on a religious practice that decreases 
productivity, the courts should not find a Title VII violation.210  
On the other hand, what if a hypersensitive atheistic employee is 
distracted by any religious expression no matter how unobtrusive?211  
Reasonableness is the rule.212  Fellow employees are not given 
unbridled power to stifle the religious expression of their 
coworkers.213  “An employer . . . has no legal obligation to suppress 
any and all religious expression merely because it annoys a single 
employee.”214  Employers do not have to stop employees from 
202. See infra notes 203–10 and accompanying text.
203. See Allen v. City of Pocahontas, 340 F.3d. 551, 557 (8th Cir. 2003); see also Baty v.
Willamette Indus., Inc., 172 F.3d 1232, 1246 (10th Cir. 1999); see also Jenkins v.
Orkin Exterminating Co., 646 F. Supp. 1274, 1278 (E.D. Tex. 1986).
204. Religious Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/religion.cfm [https://perma.cc/9NKX-QPAA] (last
visited Dec. 18, 2019).
205. See Gunning v. Runyon, 3 F. Supp. 2d 1423, 1430 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
206. Determining whether a particular accommodation would cause an undue burden to an
employer is a factual analysis and specific to the particular circumstances of the case.
See Questions and Answers: Religious Discrimination in the Workplace, supra note
81 (listing factors which are considered when determining whether an accommodation




210. See EEOC v. Firestone Fibers & Textile Co., 515 F.3d 307, 312–13 (4th Cir. 2008).
211. See Powell v. Yellow Book USA, Inc., 445 F.3d 1074, 1078 (8th Cir. 2006).
212. See id.; see also Religious Discrimination, supra note 204.
213. See Burns v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 589 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1978) (“[U]ndue
hardship requires more than proof of some fellow-worker’s grumbling or unhappiness
with a particular accommodation to a religious belief.”).
214. Powell, 445 F.3d at 1078.
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posting religious messages in their own cubicles, even if a coworker 
complains that the messages are “inappropriate and distracting.”215   
C. Accommodating a Harassing Practice
What can employers do when an employee harasses fellow
employees with religion?216  Initially, it is important for employers 
not to assume that an employee’s religious expression annoys 
coworkers.217  Although employers may view religious expression in 
the workplace as a potential liability, it is becoming increasingly 
common.218  On the theory that it is safer to avoid the whole topic, 
some employers have tried prohibiting all religious expression, but 
Title VII does not allow this.219  Singling out religious speech as 
taboo while allowing other types of speech is discrimination.220 
Sometimes courts say religious speech is protected even if it is 
irritating and unwelcome, as long as it is not demeaning or 
degrading.221  Given the protected nature of speech and the required 
accommodation of religious practices under the law, “the 
presumption should favor the worker’s religious expression unless it 
demeans or devalues another worker’s” religion.222     
215. Id.
216. See infra notes 217–43 and accompanying text.
217. See EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 75, at 24.
218. See Flake, supra note 1, at 705–06.  Courts sometimes assume otherwise, but
commentators recognize that religious conversation with coworkers is not necessarily
unwelcome.  See Debbie N. Kaminer, Religious Accomodation in the Workplace: Why
Federal Courts Fail to Provide Meaningful Protection of Religious Employees, 20
TEX. REV. L. & POL. 107, 143–44 (2015) [hereinafter Religious Accomodation in the
Workplace]; see Ruan, supra note 149, at 23–25.  Likewise, coworkers may approach
religious displays with friendly interest and curiosity.  Flake, supra note 1, at 706.
219. “Title VII violations may result if an employer tries to avoid potential co-worker
objections to employee religious expression by preemptively banning all religious
communications in the workplace, since Title VII requires that employees’ sincerely
held religious practices and beliefs be accommodated as long as no undue hardship is
posed.”  See EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 75, at 24.
220. See Ruan, supra note 149, at 22.
221. Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 607–08 (9th Cir. 2004).
A good portion of disturbing or “offensive” religious speech is 
simply the discussion of religious ideas, the advancing of some 
ideas, and the criticism of others.  Such forms of religious speech, 
however provocative, differ from racist and sexist speech, which 
typically involve an attack on the personal characteristics or status 
of an individual.  To attack someone’s ideas can madden and 
disturb that person, but it remains distinct from attacking the 
person himself. 
Berg, supra note 96, at 965. 
222. Ruan, supra note 149, at 32.
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In fact, expression about religion is entitled to more protection in 
the workplace than expression about other subjects.223  The First 
Amendment does not protect employees in a private workplace from 
employer restrictions, but Title VII steps in to protect their religious 
speech.224 
Religious expression warrants protection higher even than 
other kinds of protected expression.  The power of religion 
derives, in large part, from a sense in the believer that a 
higher power requires certain conduct.  Further, there is an 
eternal consequence attendant to the believer’s obedience or 
disobedience.  Praying or proselytizing may not be matters 
of discretion.  Thus, the price of silencing religion seems to 
be far greater than the price of silencing other kinds of 
expression.  Souls suffer no eternal harm (indeed, they may 
benefit) where non-religious expression is limited.  Other 
concerns counsel against general censorship, but religion is 
something different.  “I’ll pray for you” is qualitatively 
different from “I don’t have time for you—unless you tell 
me what you’re wearing.”  While it would be perfectly 
reasonable for employers to foster something close to a 
zero-tolerance policy regarding sexual expression, it is 
highly objectionable—both to many employees and to our 
tradition of religious liberty—to do so with respect to 
religious expression.225 
Hostile environment harassment cases are, after all, discrimination 
cases, and “it cannot be religious discrimination for an employee 
simply to express her own faith affirmatively.”226  Following “[t]his 
rule would protect almost all displays of religious clothing, jewelry, 
and art, as well as probably the largest share of religious statements.  
It simply is not harassment of others to say something positive about 
one’s own faith.”227  In short, a request to display religious posters, 
223. Kimball E. Gilmer & Jeffrey M. Anderson, Zero Tolerance for God?: Religious
Expression in the Workplace After Ellerth and Faragher, 42 HOW. L.J. 327, 344
(1999).
224. See id. at 328–29.
225. Id. at 344.
226. Berg, supra note 96, at 989.
227. Id.  “[A]ffirmative expressions of one’s own faith or lack of faith, not targeted at an
objecting individual, cannot be harassment. . . . Bible verses on . . . paychecks just
cannot be harassment. . . . There is a difference between affirmatively pursuing one’s
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symbols, or statues should be accommodated, unless they contain 
something directly negative about others.228  When “an employee 
contends that she has a religious need to impose personally and 
directly on fellow employees,” this cannot be accommodated.229 
When one employee’s religious expression protected under Title 
VII conflicts with another’s Title VII right to be free of harassment, 
which employee wins?230  “Each of these countervailing rights is a 
form of religious liberty; each of these countervailing rights is part of 
the right not to be discriminated against in employment on the basis 
of religion.”231  The easy answer is the harassed employee wins.232  
The obligation to accommodate religious expression ends where 
unlawful harassment (or any other violation of law) begins.233 
own faith and attacking, denigrating, or interfering with someone else’s faith.” 
Symposium, supra note 61, at 128 (statement of Professor Douglas Laycock). 
228. “Is there any functional difference between posters that denigrate others’ religious
beliefs and words actually spoken to an individual that do the same thing?”  Gilmer &
Anderson, supra note 223, at 341–42; see Fleming, supra note 133, at 11.
229. Chalmers v. Tulon Co. of Richmond, 101 F.3d 1012, 1021 (4th Cir. 1996).
230. See Ruan, supra note 149, at 21.
In accommodating religion in the workplace, courts 
necessarily face a balancing act.  Courts must balance the right of 
employees to be free to express their religious identities with 
other employees’ right not to work in a hostile environment and 
employers’ interest in maintaining a respectful atmosphere 
conducive to productivity.  When faced with having to balance 
competing rights and interests, judges are in the inevitable 
position of line drawing.  So how can courts draw lines that foster 
workplace norms that include tolerating differing forms of 
religious expression? 
Id. 
231. The Effect of the EEOC’s Proposed Guidelines on Religion in the Workplace:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 103d Cong. 39 (1994) (statement of Professor Douglas Laycock).
232. See Kaminer, supra note 1, at 86; See Religious Accomodation in the Workplace,
supra note 218, at 143.
233. Kaminer, supra note 1, at 97.
Relying on Hardison, lower courts have unanimously agreed that 
employers are not required to violate valid statutes in 
accommodating a religious employee since requiring such a 
violation would constitute more than a de minimis cost.   
Since Title VII prohibits hostile work environment 
harassment, section 701(j) does not require an employer to 
accommodate a religious employee if such an accommodation 
would result in a hostile work environment.  Therefore, Title 
VII’s prohibition of hostile work environment harassment trumps 
the statute’s requirement of accommodation of religious 
employees, and . . . courts are more concerned with prohibiting 
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[A]n employer never has to accommodate expression of a
religious belief in the workplace where such an
accommodation could potentially constitute harassment of
co-workers, because that would pose an undue hardship for
the employer.  Therefore, while Title VII requires
employers to accommodate an employee’s sincerely held
religious belief in engaging in religious expression (e.g.,
proselytizing) in the workplace, an employer does not have
to allow such expression if it imposes an undue hardship on
the operation of the business.  For example, it would be an
undue hardship for an employer to accommodate
proselytizing by an employee if it constituted potentially
unlawful religious harassment of a co-worker who found it
unwelcome, or if it otherwise interfered with the operation
of the business.234
Proselytizing to other employees has been met with inconsistent 
treatment.235  In one case, the Seventh Circuit held that a company 
was “not required to accommodate [the employee’s] religion by 
permitting her to distribute pamphlets offensive to other 
employees.”236  In contrast, the EEOC instructs employers to:  
[T]rain managers to gauge the actual disruption posed by
religious expression in the workplace, rather than merely
speculating that disruption may result. Employers should
also train managers to identify alternative accommodations
that might be offered to avoid actual disruption (e.g.,
designating an unused or private location in the workplace
where a prayer session or Bible study meeting can occur if it
is disrupting other workers).237
hostile work environment harassment than with accommodating 
religious employees. 
Id. 
234. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 75, at 43–44.
235. See infra notes 236–37 and accompanying text.
236. Ervington v. LTD Commodities, L.L.C., 555 F. App’x 615, 618 (7th Cir. 2014).
237. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 75, at 47.
 According to the EEOC an employer should not try to 
suppress all religious expression in the workplace. . . . The EEOC 
cautions employers not to speculate on possible disruptions but to 
train managers to gauge the actual disruption posed by religious 
expression in the workplace. . . . Employers should consider 
incorporating into anti-harassment training for managers and 
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When religious expression causes hardship, reflexive censorship is 
not the answer.238  Courts favor alternative solutions less restrictive 
of religious speech.239  The reasonable accommodation requirement 
calls for the employer to try to find a compromise that allows 
expression without undue hardship.240  Accommodations are not 
considered reasonable unless they resolve the conflict between the 
employee’s religion and the employer’s requirements.241  This is a 
fact-based inquiry.242  The employee in Wilson whose religion 
compelled her to wear a large button with a photograph of an aborted 
fetus was held reasonably accommodated when her employer 
allowed her to wear the button around the office if it was covered.243  
D. Accommodating a Display Likely to Be Misattributed
No one should be required to appear, falsely, to support the
religious views of an employee or coworker.244  Therefore, when the 
worry is misattribution, the compromise must foreclose such 
confusion.245 
For employers, placement of the religious message is an important 
factor.246  There is no danger of misattribution when employees place 
personal religious articles in their own offices or cubicles.247  The 
EEOC Guidelines provide an example of two employees hanging the 
same “Jesus Saves” poster: an employer would be required to allow 
an employee with a private office and little public contact to hang the 
employees a discussion of religious expression and the need for 
all employees to be sensitive to the beliefs or nonbeliefs of others.   
Accommodating Religion, Belief and Spirituality in the Workplace, SOC’Y HUM. RES. 
MGMT. 7 (Sept. 10, 2015), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/tools-and-
samples/toolkits/pages/accommodating-religion,-belief-and-spirituality-in-the-
workplace.aspx [https://perma.cc/9RL5-TSCN]. 
238. See Tucker v. State of Cal. Dep’t of Educ., 97 F.3d 1204, 1215 (9th Cir. 1996)
(holding that state agency’s complete ban on display of religious materials in the
office was not reasonable).
239. See id. at 1216.
240. See 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(b) (1968).
241. Wilson v. U.S. W. Commc’ns Inc., 860 F. Supp. 665, 672 (D. Neb. 1994) (citing
Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 69 (1986)).
242. Id. (quoting Redmond v. GAF Corp., 574 F.2d 897, 902 (7th Cir. 1978)).
243. Id. at 675.
244. See Warnock v. Archer, 380 F.3d 1076, 1082 (8th Cir. 2004).
245. See id. at 1081.
246. See id. at 1082.
247. Id. (citing Brown v. Polk County, 61 F.3d 650, 658 (8th Cir. 1995)).  Nor is
misattribution likely when an employee places “unobtrusive displays of religious
adherence,” such as a cross pendant on his own body.  Draper v. Logan Cty. Pub.
Library, 403 F. Supp. 2d 608, 621 (W.D. Ky. 2005).
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poster; however, an employer would not be forced to allow a security 
guard to hang the same poster at the front desk because that would 
pose an undue hardship.248   
At one end of the scale, then, is the private office or cubicle of the 
employee, where the most religious expression should be permitted 
since misattribution is least likely; at the other end of the scale is the 
front entrance, where requiring accommodation for religious articles 
is most likely to lead to misattribution.249  What about all of the 
geographical territory in between?250  The test is reasonableness: an 
employer is permitted “restrictions on speech that an observer could 
reasonably attribute” to the business.251  In common areas, such as 
hallways and lunchrooms, “[r]easonable persons are not likely to 
consider all of the information posted on bulletin boards or walls . . . 
to be [employer]-sponsored or endorsed.”252   
Even public employers cannot prohibit religious displays 
altogether;253 the public employer must walk the fine line between 
First Amendment free exercise254 and Title VII accommodation on 
the one hand255 and First Amendment establishment on the other.256  
Government employers cannot single out religious content for 
prohibition on the ground that it might be misattributed.257  The 
248. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 75, at 40–41.
249. See Tucker v. State of Cal. Dep’t of Educ., 97 F.3d 1204, 1216 (9th Cir. 1996).
250. See id.
251. See B.H. ex rel. Hawk v. Easton Area Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 293, 308 (3d Cir. 2013);
see also Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007) (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist.
v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988)).
252. See Tucker, 97 F.3d at 1215.
253. “The defendants would have us hold that their ‘interest’ in avoiding a claim against
them that they have violated the establishment clause allows them to prohibit religious
expression altogether in their workplace[].  Such a position is too extravagant to
maintain . . . .”  Brown v. Polk County, 61 F.3d 650, 659 (8th Cir. 1995); see Chabad-
Lubavitch of Ga. v. Miller, 5 F.3d 1383, 1394 (11th Cir. 1993).
254. See Brown, 61 F.3d at 653.
255. See id.
256. See id. at 659.
257. See Tucker, 97 F.3d at 1215.
[I]t is not reasonable to allow employees to post materials around
the office on all sorts of subjects, and forbid only the posting of
religious information and materials.  The challenged ban not only
prevents employees from posting non-controversial information
that might interest some or all employees—such as bulletins
announcing the time and location of church services, invitations to
children of employees to join a church youth group, and
newspaper clippings praising Billy Graham, Mother Theresa or
Cardinal Bernardin—it would also ban religious messages on
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question must be: would a reasonable observer perceive the display 
as the government endorsing religion?258 
How does an employer accommodate the need for religious 
expression without imposing the possibility of misattribution on a 
coworker?259  Again, placement should dictate the result.260  “Often 
courts’ decisions hinge on whether the employee expressed his 
religious beliefs within his own private workspace or in a common 
area.  Courts should be more willing to treat the former as protected 
speech . . . .”261  If coworkers shared an office, a common wall in the 
office would be understood as common to both office occupants, but 
if each employee had a separate desk, a display on a desk would not 
be misattributed.262  For coworkers who occupy the same desk at 
different times, the religious employee could be required to put the 
display out of sight when leaving; if a display is removed from view, 
no one has standing to claim an injury from it.263 
Why not provide the religious employee with his or her own 
office?264  There are numerous Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA) cases indicating that providing an employee with a single 
controversial subjects such as abortion, abstinence of various 
types, family values, and the v-chip.  Material that addresses 
controversial topics from a non-religious viewpoint would, 
however, be permissible, as would signs inviting employees to 
motorcycle rallies, swap meets, x-rated movies, beer busts, 
burlesque shows, massage parlors or meetings of the local militia. 
The prohibition is unreasonable not only because it bans a vast 
amount of material without legitimate justification but also 
because its sole target is religious speech. 
Id.; see also Chandler v. Siegelman, 230 F.3d 1313, 1316 (11th Cir. 2000) (“The 
Establishment Clause does not require the elimination of private speech endorsing 
religion in public places.  The Free Exercise Clause does not permit the State to 
confine religious speech to whispers or banish it to broom closets.  If it did, the 
exercise of one’s religion would not be free at all.”). 
258. Tenafly Eruv Ass’n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 174 (3d Cir. 2002); see also
Kiesinger v. Mex. Acad. & Cent. Sch., 427 F.Supp. 2d 182, 191 (N.D.N.Y. 2006).
259. See infra notes 260–67 and accompanying text.
260. See Laura M. Johnson, Note, Whether to Accommodate Religious Expression that
Conflicts with Employer Anti-Discrimination and Diversity Policies Designed to
Safeguard Homosexual Rights: A Multi-Factor Approach for the Courts, 38 CONN. L. 
REV. 295, 315 (2005).
261. Id.; see Kent Greenawalt, Title VII and Religious Liberty, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 51–
52 (2001).
262. See Johnson, supra note 260, at 315–17.
263. Barber v. Bryant, 860 F.3d 345, 353–54 (5th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S.Ct. 652
(2018); Staley v. Harris County, 485 F.3d 305, 309 (5th Cir. 2007).
264. See infra notes 265–67 and accompanying text.
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office can be a reasonable accommodation.265  Title VII, however, 
expressly prohibits employers from “segregating” religious 
employees.266  “Anti-discrimination laws are designed, in part, to 
increase the employment opportunities of groups that have been 
segregated in the workplace.  The purposes of antidiscrimination 
laws would not be furthered by allowing continued segregation based 
on co-worker preference.”267 
VI. CONCLUSION
Title VII requires accommodation of religious practices when it
will not cause undue hardship to the employer.268  Religious 
expression, including religious display, is protected under Title 
VII.269  Although employers are not required to bear more than de
minimis expense to accommodate employee religious practices,270 the
types of hardship attached to religious expression are generally
nonmonetary.271
At least four hardships can result from religious displays in the 
workplace.272  First, customers may complain or take their business 
elsewhere.273  Second, other employees may be distracted by 
religious expression and suffer a loss of productivity.274  Third, the 
religious display of one worker can constitute harassment of a 
coworker.275  And fourth, the display may be misattributed to the 
employer or a coworker.276   
265. See Grear v. Miller & Newberg, Inc., No. 15-7458-JAR, 2016 WL 4095429, at *9 (D.
Kan. Aug. 2, 2016); see EEOC v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 949 F.
Supp. 403, 407–08 (E.D. Va. 1996); see Pamela S. Karlen & George Rutherglen,
Disabilities, Discrimination and Reasonable Accommodation, 46 Duke L.J. 1, 36
(1996).
266. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012); Dawinder S. Sidhu, Out of Sight, Out of Legal
Recourse: Interpreting and Revising Title VII to Prohibit Workplace Segregation
Based on Religion, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 103, 105 (2012).
267. Theresa M. Beiner & John M. A. DiPippa, Hostile Environments and the Religious
Employee, 19 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 577, 605 (1997).
268. Ghumman et al., supra note 1, at 444.
269. See supra notes 75–93 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 94–106 and accompanying text.
271. See supra Part IV.
272. See supra Part IV.
273. See supra Section IV.A.
274. See supra Section IV.B.
275. See supra Section IV.C.
276. See supra Section IV.D.
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Ultimately, accommodation of religious expression requires 
compromise between the employer and employee.277  Both are 
required to be reasonable.278  Courts have applied inconsistent 
approaches to addressing the hardship of customer discomfort; some 
approve curbing religious expression toward customers, while others 
require employers to allow it.279  In addressing the hardship of 
coworker distraction, employers have been permitted to insist on 
measures to reduce distracting or disturbing religious 
communications to coworkers.280  And, while the Title VII right to 
engage in religious practices at work should never be construed to 
require another employee to endure religious harassment, 
unreasonably sensitive employees may not censor the religious 
speech of their coworkers.281  Finally, as both employers and 
coworkers have a legitimate interest in not having religious displays 
falsely attributed to them, rules regarding size and placement of those 
displays should be permissible to accommodate an employee’s 
religious expression, while preserving the legitimate business 
interests of the employer.282 
277. See supra notes 181–84 and accompanying text.
278. See supra Part V.
279. See supra Section V.A.
280. See supra Section V.B.
281. See supra Section V.C.
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